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Abstract
The present paper seeks to locate the Bhaduri-Marglin (B-M) model as an historical outcome of the Left's
internal disputes over the prospects for social democracy. In better contextualizing the B-M model as a
historical response to the perceived political economic failings of the social compromises upon which the
growth of post-War advanced capitalist economies had rested, both the model’s popularity and its potential
limitations can more easily be understood. Though the B-M framework has frequently come to be referred
to as the neo- or post-Kaleckian growth model, such labels perhaps obscure the model's diverse ancestry.
The model constituted an attempt to reconcile seemingly incompatible theoretical perspectives, and to
highlight those special conditions that made possible a ‘Golden Age’ of social democracy. Moreover, they
sought to show that the conclusions of Keynesian social democrats and of radical Marxists could be viewed
as two possible outcomes of the same broadly Keynesian theoretical framework in which investment
played a leading role. While this synthesis has fostered a vast literature and useful dialogue, it is argued that
it should, nevertheless, be seen as the outcome of a generation Left social scientists that had become deeply
skeptical of the possibility of egalitarian redistribution under capitalism, and of the political ambitions of
Keynesian and social democratic parties.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Seven years removed from the immediate turmoil of the Great Financial Crisis, relative stagnation
continues to plague the world's advanced capitalist economies. Within the mainstream of the economics
profession, the triumphant heralds of the Great Moderation have given way to varied accounts of secular
stagnation. Emblematic of this volte-face is the endlessly adaptable Larry Summers. Our present malaise is,
in Summers' view, the product of the slowed growth of population, a more modest pace of technological
change, and a burgeoning profit share of national income. Though not impervious to policy intervention,
this confluence of trends offers scant ground for optimism that private productive investment will be
sufficient to ensure full employment. Countering stagnation will require a “commitment to maintain basic
social protections so as to maintain spending power, and measures to reduce inequality and so redistribute
income towards those with a higher propensity to spend” (Summers 2014, pp. 38). Summers' proposals,
accompanied as they are by calls to improve the confidence of businesses and to reduce the ‘structural
barriers’ hindering private investment, are of course far from radical. It is striking, nevertheless, that such a
modest proposal that ties the recovery of growth to redistribution should put Summers at odds with a
significant body of economic thought on the Left. Though by no means monolithic, many prominent
figures on the Left have come to view traditional social democratic redistributive strategies as not only an
exhausted political platform, but also as incompatible with sustained economic growth in contemporary
capitalism.
In his forward to the renewal of the New Left Review in 2000, Perry Anderson offered what is
now a familiar requiem for the post-War historical and social conditions in which the Left flourished.
Among those who had once seen the transcendence of capitalism as a genuine possibility, Anderson noted
two distinct dispositions consequent to the Left's historical failures. The first was marked by
accommodation, and acceptance that the private enterprise system, when accompanied by modest social
protections, was a demonstrably optimal form of economic organization. In the other, he saw the Left
desperately searching for ways to console itself, seeing in every fragmented social movement and transitory
crisis of accumulation the grounds for reasoned hope. For Anderson, the Left should instead adopt an
“uncompromising realism” that would refuse “any accommodation with the ruling system, and rejecting
every piety and euphemism that would understate its power” (Anderson 2000, pp. 14). Borrowing
Anderson's terminology, the Bhaduri-Marglin model can best be seen as an effort to supply such an
uncompromising realism. The present paper thus seeks to better locate the Bhaduri-Marglin model as an
historical outcome of the Left's internal disputes over the prospects for social democracy. In better
contextualizing the B-M model as a historical response to the perceived political economic failings of the
social compromises upon which the growth of post-War advanced capitalist economies had rested, both the
model’s popularity and its potential limitations can more easily be understood.
In the twenty-five years since its initial publication, the Bhaduri-Marglin (B-M) model (1990),
though subject to many extensions and amendments, has assumed a central role in the attempts of postKeynesians to understand the interaction of distribution and accumulation. Seeking to reconcile the
apparently intractable theoretical opposition of Keynesian social democrats and radical Marxists, the model
plainly demonstrated the demands of co-operative capitalism. For its original authors, the model was
motivated, at least proximately, by the desire to formally identify the distinctive institutional features that
yielded the post-War accumulation regime of the 1950s and 60s wherein sustained accumulation coincided
with marked increases in real wages and productivity. In their analysis, the viability of social democracy
had depended on the persistence of a stagnationist accumulation regime wherein the growth of effective
demand prompted by rising real wages would act as the overwhelming motive for continued investment,
more than outweighing the fall in the profit share of national income. Such conditions were, nevertheless,
far from guaranteed as varieties of capitalism might instead assume the form of ‘exhilarationist’ regimes. In
such cases, the tenuous political compromises of co-operative capitalism would inevitably crumble in the
face of the technical impossibility of wage-led growth.
As the ‘Golden Age’ of Western capitalism increasingly recedes from the collective memory, the
“gospel of co-operative capitalism” meets with few acolytes (Marglin 1988, p. 10). The B-M model has
nevertheless spawned an extensive empirical literature seeking to identify the nature of contemporary
growth regimes as either profit- or wage-led. This literature testifies not only to a remarkable degree of
consensus among post-Keynesian authors, but also an acceptance that co-operative capitalism is a special
case whose technical demands may, or may not be satisfied. With the considerable rise in the profit share of
national income witnessed over the past 30 years in many advanced capitalist economies, and the modest

growth that has accompanied it, some authors have strained to see the emergence of an exhilarationist
regime. Apart from the reluctant acceptance of the policy prescriptions of the Right implied by this
characterization of growth, authors working within this tradition have also tended, until recently, to neglect
the role of household debt accumulation in sustaining effective demand. If, as seems increasingly plain, this
rise in household debt was the necessary complement to the realization of profit-led growth, the present
prospects for revived rates of growth in the absence of social democratic reforms appear grim.
2 KALECKIAN INSPIRATIONS?
Though the B-M framework has frequently come to be referred to as the neo- or post-Kaleckian
growth model, such labels perhaps obscure the model's diverse ancestry. As Bhaduri and Marglin explicitly
note, the model constituted an attempt to reconcile seemingly incompatible theoretical perspectives, and to
highlight those special conditions that made possible a ‘Golden Age’ of social democracy. They sought to
show that the conclusions of Keynesian social democrats and of radical Marxists could be viewed as two
possible outcomes of the same broadly Keynesian theoretical framework in which investment played a
leading role. Moreover, the model offered reasoned doubt over whether it might be possible to recreate the
conditions of Keynesian social democracy's golden age, as such stagnationist conditions were “very much
bound to particular places and times.” It was therefore a mistake to see wage-led co-operative capitalism as
anything more than an unsustainable and transitory regime. For Bhaduri and Marglin, the redistributive
policies of the Left could only be persistently viable if the linkage between accumulation and profitability
was severed.
Reservations regarding the transformative potential of social-democratic movements are deepseated within the Left and, of course, well antedate the theoretical projects of J.M. Keynes and Michał
Kalecki. Even the casual student of Marxism is familiar with the old invectives of “reformism” and
“opportunism” regularly lobbed by the keepers of the old-time religion. Still, the contours of this debate
were irreversibly altered by the ‘Keynesian Revolution,’ and by the generation of authors that sought to
extend the principle of effective demand beyond the short-period framework adopted by Keynes in the
General Theory. Beyond the possibility of smoothing the extremes of the business cycle, this theoretical
revolution highlighted the potential compatibility of sustained growth with a rising wage share in national
income. In dethroning savings from its previously hallowed position, Keynesian theory seemed to offer a
potential class compromise in which income redistribution, and lowered rates of interest were the prices to
be paid if capitalism was to retain its potential for dynamism and growth. It was Keynes' view that “a great
advantage” of the social and economic transformations he had proposed was that they would be “merely a
gradual but prolonged continuance of what we have seen recently in Great Britain, and will need no
revolution” (Keynes 1936, pp. 376).
Little wonder then that those working within the Marxian tradition should have viewed Keynesian
theory with skepticism. Keynes, no doubt, depicted unemployment and the polarized distribution of wealth
and income as “outstanding faults,” but also as technical problems that could be resolved within the
confines of the capitalist mode of production. The image of Keynes provided by Paul Sweezy upon the
former's death in 1946 would seem to find resonance among the contemporary Left. Sweezy while directly
acknowledging Keynes to have been “the greatest British (or American) economist since Ricardo,” saw his
great failing in “the inability to see the present as history, to understand that the disasters and catastrophes
amidst which we live are not simply a ‘frightful muddle’ but are the direct and inevitable product of a
social system that has exhausted its creative powers, but whose beneficiaries are determined to hang on
regardless of the cost” (Sweezy 1946, pp. 404).
Having independently arrived at many of the transformative ideas of the General Theory, despite
having drawn almost exclusively upon Marxist writers and his own empirical research, Kalecki was
perhaps the best positioned to critically assess the book's theoretical import and its limitations. As is well
known, Kalecki saw the maintenance of full-employment as a relatively simple technical problem so long
as the State stood ready to meet the shortfall of private investment. The difficulty, with respect to
maintaining full-employment, was political as business leaders and rentiers would rebel against lasting
conditions that challenged their extra-economic power.1
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In a telling and prescient comment, Kalecki notes that business leaders “would probably find more than one
economist to declare that the situation was manifestly unsound” (Kalecki 1971 [1943], p. 144). That modern
‘Kaleckians’ might ably play this role was not anticipated.

Much of the lasting character of Kalecki's responses is captured by his first public commentary on
Keynes' path-breaking work. In his 1936 review, with first appeared in the Polish language journal
Ekonomista, Kalecki plainly identified the two instrumental components of Keynes' theory. With respect to
the first component, the determination of short-period equilibrium on the basis of the multiplier mechanism
and effective demand, Kalecki had no fundamental objections. Kalecki's major objections instead concern
the investment function proposed by Keynes. He first notes that Keynes had rightly supposed that a fall in
nominal wages would have no beneficial impact on output and employment in the short-run. Kalecki
nevertheless saw Keynes' theoretical defense of this proposition as inadequate. As a remedy for this
deficiency, Kalecki offers a neat sketch of his own model wherein investment is dependent on expected
profitability, a variable that is for firms clouded in some uncertainty, but which firms in practice gauge via
current realized profitability. Current profitability is, however, dependent upon past acts of investment
spending. Thus a fall in nominal wages does not, in itself, lead to a rise in profitability. Profitability will
rise only if firms immediately undertake a higher level of investment in the present in response. Failing this,
the rise in profitability will be “illusory.” Kalecki also seems to suggest that Keynes had not adequately
accounted for the impact of the accelerator mechanism. As he describes it, an initial rise in investment will,
following Keynes' theory prompt not only a rise in the prices of investment goods, but also a general rise in
prices and in output. This expansion suggests that “expectations will become more optimistic and a
difference between the marginal efficiency of investment and the rate of interest will arise again.
‘Equilibrium’ then is not reached and the growth of investment will persist” (Kalecki 1982 [1936], pp.
252). While Kalecki was to later suggest that this otherwise interminable boom in investment would
eventually be constrained when firms became limited by his principle of increasing risk, it is clear in this
early model that Kalecki views current profitability as only the ephemeral guide of investment. The profits
realized in the present do not hinge so much on the outcomes of on-going distributive conflicts, but rather
on investment spending decisions already undertaken.2
Kalecki's subsequent work maintained remarkably consistent positions relative to this early vision.
With respect to his views on the workability of a social-democratic version of capitalism, Kalecki's 1944
essay “Three Ways to Full Employment,” is revealing. Here, in the context of a closed economy, Kalecki
explores the viability and the efficacy of three strategies that might secure full employment: increased
public investment, stimulus of private investment, or a measure of egalitarian redistribution. Consistent in
his analysis, Kalecki notes that the volatility of employment and private investment are the consequence of
“violent fluctuations in profits.” Central to our discussion is the further clarification that “[t]he causation is
actually double-sided: a fall in investment causes a fall in effective demand and profits, and this in turn
leads to a new decline in investment” (Kalecki 1990 [1944], p. 365, footnote). As in his immediate
discussion of the General Theory, Kalecki sees current investment and profitability as determined by
effective demand in the past. Consequently, while viewing direct government expenditures, whether tax- or
deficit-financed, as the ideal means by which to achieve full employment Kalecki does not discount the
efficacy of redistributive measures. As he notes, “[c]utting profit margins–either in the form of price
reductions of consumer goods or wages increases with constant prices–undertaken within the framework of
price control will also increase effective demand and thus make the task of government expenditure to
secure full employment easier” (Ibid, p. 376). Thus wage-led growth could not be achieved in the absence
of price controls; that is, in the absence of forces that would curtail the degree of monopoly.
The consistency of Kalecki's position warrants further emphasis. In his brief 1970 essay, “Theories
of Growth in Different Social System,” Kalecki surveyed the dominant theories of long-run growth that had
emerged following the General Theory. These approaches shared a neglect of problem of effective demand,
and a tendency to assume that resources would be fully utilized in the long-run, given adequate price
flexibility. Ever the empiricist, Kalecki's concern was that these models might be of little value in
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  Kalecki's discussion (1938) of the labor policies of the short-lived Popular Front in France–what he termed the “Blum
experiment”– is also instructive. The dramatic rise in nominal wages experienced over the course of 1936, coupled with
only modest increases in the deficit relative to national income, offered to Kalecki's mind an ideal natural experiment.
For Kalecki, the statistical evidence he had complied supplied a robust confirmation that a dramatic rise in nominal
wages exercised no negative impact on output. Further, Kalecki suspected that the modest increases in the real wages of
industrial workers “must have increased effective demand and thus the output of industry” (p. 40). This buoyant effect
was mitigated not by a decline in the rate of profit, but rather by the redistributive effects of inflation that transferred
income from small rentiers and salaried white-collar workers to entrepreneurs.

	
  

understanding past or future patterns of growth, particularly within capitalist economies in which quasimonopolistic pricing was the norm. Indeed the irony for Kalecki was that maintenance of full-employment
by government intervention had also provided “a climate favorable” for a new family of models whose
construction was “unperturbed by the problem of effective demand” (Kalecki 1993 [1970], p. 113). Thus
for Kalecki the problem of long-run growth within capitalist economies could be adequately treated only if
the assumption of full utilization was discarded once and for all. As Kalecki made clear in his final
published essay (1971 [1970], p. 163), in typical capitalist economies in which resources remain less than
fully utilized “a wage rise leads – contrary to the precepts of classical economics – to an increase in
employment” and to a rise in realized profitability. That is, there would be no technical impediment to a
process of wage-led growth.
3 ROBINSON’S INFLUENCE
With this understanding of Kalecki in mind, the influence of Kalecki’s own approach on the B-M
model appears more slight than is commonly appreciated. Rather than being colored by Kalecki, the
modern post-Kaleckian approach arguably draws far more from Joan Robinson’s perspective. There was
perhaps no figure more concerned with carrying the mantle of Keynes into the long-run than Joan
Robinson. This preoccupation figures early and often in Robinson’s work, having been first clearly
articulated in her essay “The Long-Period Theory of Employment” (1936), but it is in Robinson’s mature
work that the distinctive features of her long-run growth model first emerge.3 Extending Keynes meant, for
Robinson, affording a central place to the paradox of thrift in the long-period as well as the short period,
and providing an alternative to the savings-led models of growth that had given new life to Say's Law.
Robinson, though she was one of the great champions of the originality and import and Kalecki's work,
never fully adopted the latter's approach to the interaction of distribution and accumulation. For Robinson,
an extension of the Kaleckian model to the long-period merely demonstrates that investment has inertia; the
level of investment in the present is conditioned by its level in the past. The question of why a given trend
level of investment is established remains open. The decisive features of Robinson's approach concern the
treatment and formal modeling of the investment decision, and the related assumption that productive
capacity would be fully utilized in the long-period. For Kalecki, as we have seen, investment in the present
was governed only superficially by the rate of profit, as this rate was, in turn, the result of past investment
choices on the part of the capitalist class. A redistribution of real income towards workers, effected through
nominal wages increase, while it might prove tenuous and fleeting in a world of oligopolistic pricing,
would not necessarily depress the rate of accumulation, provided that the economy operated below fullcapacity utilization, and was not heavily export-dependent. The principle impediment to the realization of
full-employment accompanied by steady growth was not technical put political. The assumption that excess
capacity would persist in the long-period was then a crucial feature of all of Kalecki's work. Indeed his
well-known comment that “the long-run trend is but a slowly changing component of a chain of shortperiod situations” can be understood in this way (Kalecki 1971, p. 165).4
The approach pursued by Robinson instead centered around what is now known as the Cambridge
Equation, the proposition that accumulation at any given moment in ‘logical time’ served to determine
income distribution through the rate of profit. Moreover, Robinson assumes that competition in the shortperiod leads firms to produce at “normal capacity” in the long-period, a point of production beyond which a
“seller's market prevails and capacity is being strained” (Robinson 1962a, p. 46-7). Investment in the
present is then dependent upon the rate of profit firms expect to obtain in the future. Though in tranquil
conditions the currently prevailing rate of profit might serve as the best proxy for the expected rate,
investment is ultimately governed by animal spirits. Trend growth is thus determined by “the propensity to
accumulate inherent in the system. It is steady or fluctuating according as it operates in tranquil conditions
which generate inertia, or in a chancy world where uncertainty makes expectations volatile” (Robinson
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  As noted by Heinrich Bortis (1997, p. 205), Robinson's framework along with much of the Kaleckian-Robinsonian
tradition might be more accurately understood as a medium-term “business cycle-cum growth” theory.
4
	
  Kalecki also closes his discussion in this essay with the comments that “in our approach the rate of growth at a given
time is a phenomenon rooted in past economic, social and technological developments…This is, indeed, very different
from the approach of purely ‘mechanistic’ theories (based frequently on such fallacious a prioiri assumptions as a
constant degree of long-run utilization of equipment), but seems to me much closer to the realities of the process of
economic development” (Kalecki 1971, p. 183).

1962a, p. 87).5 For a given propensity to consume out of profits, and in the absence of savings by workers,
the rate of growth serves to realize the profit rate expectations that originally motivated accumulation (Ibid,
p. 71). Growth is thus led by expectations as to the rate of profit. At full employment, optimistic turns of
expectations will raise the desired rate of accumulation, pushing against the capacity barrier at which the
economy operates. Thus through rising prices, and the consequent fall in real wages that the rate of profit is
enabled to rise in the next moment of logical time. Robinson's inflation barrier poses the functional limit to
this logical chain of events. It is only once real wages have fallen to the minimum level deemed socially
acceptable that the resistance of labor to further cuts in real wages arrests further rises in the rate of profit
(Robinson 1962a, p. 13, and Robinson 1956, p. 48-50).6
As was her habit, Robinson's formal models are littered with reservations about the applicability of
such analysis to actually existing economies. In her attempt to summarize the varying perspectives on
growth she concludes that “[t]hese models are all too much simplified and too highly integrated for it to be
possible to confront them with evidence from reality” (Robinson 1962a, p. 87). Elsewhere, in Economic
Philosophy, she notes that “[t]o understand the motives for investment, we have to understand human
nature and the manner in which it reacts to the various kinds of social and economic systems in which it has
to operate. We have not got far enough yet to put it into algebra” (Robinson 1962b, p. 107, emphasis
added).7 Thus Robinson seems generally to have pursued these models as deductive thought experiments
not susceptible to empirical testing. Certainly, any plain dismissals of wage-led growth as viable political
strategy are absent.
4 THE STAGNATIONIST TRADITION
The roots of the stagnationist perspective on capitalist development are not then to be found in
Kalecki and Robinson’s own work. A comprehensive account of all those perspectives that have claimed
for capitalism a tendency towards stagnation is beyond the scope of this paper. In focusing our attention on
the evolution of this perspective in the 20th century we can, nevertheless, be instructive. Though the most
consistent and vocal champions of this perspective have been Paul Sweezy and his partisans of the Monthly
Review School, important aspects of this theory might more accurately be seen as extensions of Alvin
Hansen's ideas.
In diagnosing the economic malaise of the 1930s, Hansen popularized the term secular stagnation
to describe persistent states of sub-full employment that differed from the inescapable cyclical oscillations
of capitalism. Hansen's engagement with the structural forces conditioning long-run economic growth
nevertheless well antedates his explicit discussion of secular stagnation. Hansen is sometimes superficially
presented as little more than an early convert to Keynesian theorizing, to be lauded for his receptiveness to
new and challenging ideas, and for his tidy pedagogical presentations of them. While his Fiscal Policy and
Business Cycles (1941) certainly did introduce a generation of students to the benefits and necessity of
public sector intervention, Hansen's own intellectual path was not, as Keynes famously described his own,
“a long struggle of escape.” Directly influenced by the institutionalists Richard Ely and John Commons
while a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin, Hansen never squarely identified with the
Marshallian tradition, and continued to draw upon eclectic influences throughout his career (Merhling
1997, p. 86-92). His incorporation of Keynesian thought was but a late addition to an already welldeveloped synthetic approach to economic theory.
Hansen's continued exploration of business cycle theory, pursued in his doctoral dissertation and
Business Cycle Theory (1927), and had initially convinced him that the downturn of the 1930s was but a
severe manifestation of the ‘normal’ cycle, wherein a great mass of workers faced, at least, temporary
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Note that Robinson's explicit intent in this passage is to set her theory apart from that of Kalecki, whose theory of
investment she discusses in the immediately preceding paragraphs. She claims here that Kalecki relies upon "a
precarious source of a motive for accumulation," as accelerated growth depends upon exogenous technical progress and
expected rises in profitability thereby induced (Robinson 1962a, p. 87).
6	
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7
One encounters similar comments in second edition of the Essay on Marxian Economics (1966) where Robinson
notes that while it is “most important” to establish conclusively the relationship between current profits, expected
profits, and investment, “the statisticians meet with a formidable difficulty…so that the evidence is hard, perhaps
impossible, to disentangle” (p. 94).

technological unemployment.8 The cycle was generally understood as the necessary mechanism through
which factor prices adjusted to account for technological shocks, as labor was generally rendered
temporarily overpriced by technological innovations (Hansen 1932a, p. 27). The greater rigidity entailed by
administered prices, and powerful trade unions had rendered this process of rectifying ‘maladjustments’
more difficult, but certainly no less necessary. Colorfully, Hansen noted that “[d]epression, like a cruel and
heartless tyrant, clubs down the impossible demands made by the employed agents of production” (Ibid, p.
31).9
As emphasized by Barber (1987), the return to recession in 1937 undermined Hansen's previously
confident analysis of the Depression as merely a severe correction of factor prices. Hansen's
reinterpretation of the downturn, detailed in Full Recovery or Stagnation? (1938), argued that output
recovery of the mid-30s had been driven by rising, government-supported, consumption. The
accompanying rise in investment had been the product of the accelerator, rather than a response to a
renewed period of technological innovation. Carried largely by public sector spending, the recovery was
predictably fragile. As Kaldor (1939) put it in his positive review of the book for The Economic Journal,
for Hansen the “recovery has demonstrated the operation of the ‘acceleration principle’…but it has also
demonstrated that this ‘acceleration principle is not potent enough either to carry activity to a really
satisfactory level or to maintain it there for any length of time” (Kaldor 1939, p. 93). The boom of the
1920s had been driven only in part by a consumption boom and the accelerator. The maturation of the auto
industry, and accompanying electrification of assembly-line processes, coupled with a rise in publicfinanced construction had, crucially, complemented the rise in private consumption. Such a propitious
confluence of factors sustaining investment was absent in the mid-1930s. It was in the face of a new era of
secular stagnation that substantial and sustained public-sector investment had become a necessity.
Hansen's discussion of secular stagnation is, however, somewhat richer than is normally appreciated, and at
times parallels Sweezy's subsequent discussion. Secular stagnation was then, for Hansen, the product of a
particular historical and institutional conjuncture. Contemporary presentations of Hansen's thesis tend to
emphasize the roles of slowing growth of population and technological progress in inducing secular
stagnation. Certainly, Hansen did argue that, in a departure from the previous 150 years, persistent
population growth could no longer be expected, while expansion into a seemingly limitless frontier had
also reached its end. This end to extensive expansion was of deep importance, but considered in isolation,
slowing population growth and territorial expansion were insufficient to generate secular stagnation. Rather
it was a complex of transformations that gave force to the possibility of secular stagnation.
New epochal industries such as the railroads, or later automobiles and the construction of public
roads had previously fueled massive waves of investment. There was, however, “no basis for the
assumption that we can take for granted the rapid emergence of new industries as rich.” Consequently, as
“[i]t is in connection with the growth, maturity, and decline of great industries that the Principle of
Acceleration operates with peculiar force” (Hansen 1941, p. 362). Moreover he suggested that along with
this diminished need for extensive expansion, Hansen also expected a reduced rate of intensive expansion.
While the transition from rural handicraft economies into capitalist machine production brought with it an
enormous rise in the capital intensity of production, similar rates of capital deepening could no longer be
expected within the capitalist sphere (Hansen 1938, p. 313-14). Hansen admits directly that “it is definitely
clear that the mere fact that there are seemingly unlimited consumer wants cannot of itself ensure fullemployment even with the most perfectly functioning price system” (Hansen 1941, p. 336).
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  Hansen's later work, Business Cycle Theory (1927), is less revealing of Hansen's own theoretical alliances. In part a
response to William Foster and Wadell Catchings' under-consumptionist work Profits (1927), Hansen offered another
systematic and diverse account of existing theories of the cycle. While chiding Foster and Catchings for their
insufficient faith in the stabilizing impact of counter-cyclical monetary policy, Hansen nevertheless continued to
maintain that cycles would persist as responses to real productivity shocks, and new technological epochs.

	
  

9

Elsewhere Hansen suggested that the 1930-31 Depression was but “one link in the chain of major depressions. It
requires, in so far, no explanation other than the general theory of the business cycle as such. The exceptional severity
of the depression, however, is to be explained partly by the drastic deflation of prices, partly by certain structural
changes in the capitalistic system…and partly by a special combination of circumstances growing out of the postwar
readjustments” (Hansen 1932b, p. 122).

Perhaps no American author was better equipped to weigh the implications of Keynesian theory
for neo-Marxist analysis than was Paul Sweezy. Judged by his Theory of Capitalist Development (1942),
and by his role as a central contributor to, and editor of the Monthly Review, Sweezy arguably did more
than any other single author to shape the course of neo-Marxist political economy in the twentieth-century.
Further, Sweezy was well-versed in the literature of continental Marxism, to a degree unmatched by many
of his contemporaries, and enjoyed direct experience as a PhD student and young assistant professor in the
administration of the New Deal (Howard and King, 2004). Though his tone could vary markedly, the
general tenor of Sweezy's commentary on Keynesian economics throughout his career deviated little.
Keynes seemingly appeared to Sweezy as something of a world-historical figure. His ideas represented the
reawakening of bourgeois political economy from a near-century of vulgarity and intellectual stagnation,
while retaining its inherent limitations. Keynes and his followers were, as an historical phenomenon, the
obvious “direct outcome of the latest phase of capitalist development” (Sweezy 1942, p. 52). In Sweezy's
telling, non-Marxist analyses of the business cycle, such as those of Hansen, Schumpeter, or Robertson,
had long treated its recurrent manifestations as both endogenous, and inexorable. In this their theories were
broadly compatible with Marx's own. What had limited orthodox theory was it unwillingness to see “the
business cycle [as] a threat to the permanence of the capitalist system itself” (Ibid, p. 154-5). Thus it was
the willingness of Keynesian theory to see long-run stagnation as a normal outcome of the process of
capitalist development that marked it as a clear advance. As a body of economic analysis, Sweezy's
objections to Keynesian theory were quite limited. As he notes, “[g]enerally speaking their logical
consistency cannot be challenged, either on their own ground, or on the basis of the Marxian analysis of the
reproduction process. The critique of Keynesian theories of liberal capitalist reform starts, therefore, not
from their economic logic but rather from their faulty assumption about the relationship…between
economics and political action” (Ibid, p. 348-9). In this respect, Sweezy's position seemingly remained
stable, as is suggested by this initial review of Hansen's Full Recovery or Stagnation (1938). Noting
Hansen's book “must be regarded as one of the most important to come from the pen of an American
economist in recent years,” Sweezy found little fault with the presentation of secular stagnation therein
calling it “brilliant and profound.” Having outlined Hansen's basic claims, Sweezy noted that “[t]he
implications of these facts for public policy are fundamental. It is extremely unlikely that capital
expenditures by business men in search of profits will ever again approach a figure adequate to support a
satisfactory national income” (Sweezy 1938, p. 545). Sweezy's skepticism was entirely directed towards the
general lack of any form of class-based analysis in Hansen's work. Sweezy faulted only Hansen's belief that
“[t]he economic system…can be analyzed and its ills prescribed for in complete abstractions from the kind
of society to which it gives rise” (Ibid, p. 544-5).
Sweezy's subsequent discussion in The Theory of Capitalist Development (1942) of the forces that
had previously forestalled stagnation plainly shares much common ground with Hansen's account, though
Hansen is not directly cited in this context.10 Sweezy first details how the process of industrialization and
the establishment of new industries absorbed enormous volumes of savings without immediately yielding
chronic over-capacity. With industrialization having largely run it course it had become “difficult even to
imagine a series of new industries that would have the same relative importance comparable to…[those] of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” (Ibid, p. 219). Further extensive expansion across the globe was
fraught, as Sweezy appraised heightened popular resistance to capitalism's expansion into pre-capitalist
spheres, and thought that existing monopolistic firms would fear any renewal of competition fostered by
the newly industrialized. With the frontier of expansion closing, sustained accumulation faced further
headwinds patterned, seemingly, after Hansen's model. Rapid population growth in the 18th and 19th
centuries had, in Sweezy's telling, removed upward pressure on wages rates allowing total consumption to
grow, and accumulation to proceed at ‘high rates’ without any accompanying downward pressure on the
rate of profit. In light of the generally acknowledged slowing of population growth in the highly
industrialized world, this force sustaining accumulation had been rendered impotent. Taken together, these
were the tendencies that had “pretty well dominated the expansion of capitalism throughout the greater part
of its history” (Ibid, p. 234). Thus the failure of new industries to emerge at a sufficiently rapid rate and the
slowing of population growth, suggested a drift towards chronic depression in the absence of new and
considerable countervailing forces. In sum, Keynesians had acknowledged that capitalism was subject to
recurrent crises, and that capitalism's internal dynamics were capable of producing long-run stagnation.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
10
Marglin himself noted this parallel and suggested that “both the liberal and radical arguments on the causes of
stagnation derive from a Keynesian world view rather than a Marxian one” (Marglin 1984, p. 101).

Keynesians were guilty of a certain political naiveté, but not of a misapprehension of the process of
accumulation and growth.
Sweezy's true ire was, rightly so, reserved for the ‘bastard Keynesians’ that side-stepped “the
reconsideration of the whole theory of investment,” and the broader social philosophy suggested by Keynes
in Chapter 24 of the General Theory, and instead transformed Keynesian analysis into a much more modest
set of business cycle remedies (Magdoff and Sweezy, 1983). To his way of thinking, Keynes had
articulated a theoretical framework in which anemic private investment would yield relative stagnation and
unemployment, but had not conclusively shown why private investment would tend towards chronic longrun insufficiency. A thorough-going explanation of why private investment would be a perpetual laggard
was not, however, provided. Other than the attempts by Hansen (1938), Sweezy charged that the followers
of Keynes had likewise avoided this question, allowing it to recede into the background amidst the revived
growth rates of the post-War world.
The relative prosperity and renewed rates accumulation in the post-War years did little to modify
the core argument. Written together with Paul Baran, Monopoly Capital (1966) more carefully traced the
evolution of the monopoly stage of US capitalism, detailing the successive trends that had forestalled
capitalism's innate tendency towards stagnation. The surprise of robust post-War growth lay in the new
outlets for investment that had materialized. Complementing high and sustained levels of military spending,
“a second great wave of automobilization and suburbanization fueled by a tremendous growth of mortgage
and consumer debt” had allowed for the absorption of surplus (Baran & Sweezy, 1966, p. 244). Baran and
Sweezy were, nevertheless, willing to double-down in claiming that these countervailing forces had again
run their course, and that an era of stagnation was once again nigh. To say the least, the continued decline
in US unemployment rates to below four percent by the close of the decade did not feature in their
forecasts.
The contributions of Josef Steindl were, of course, also of central importance to the evolution of
the stagnationist tradition. Though educated within the Austrian school, the abiding theoretical allegiance
of Steindl’s mature work was to Kalecki.11 Like Kalecki, Steindl saw the widespread and seemingly
permanent emergence of oligopolistic firms as one of the decisive transformations of the post-War era. The
long-term reduction in competitive pressures naturally brought with it comparative decline in investment.
In treating the investment decision, however, Steindl emphasized the role of capacity utilization, and
treated the expected rate of profit as a variable of secondary importance. On this basis, investment is
seen as a positive function of the difference between the actual and desired degree of capacity utilization,
internal accumulation on the part of the firm, and a negative function of the firm’s current degree of
leverage (Steindl 1952, p. 211-12). Absent the intervention of activist fiscal and redistributive policies,
rates of investment would inevitably decline, and growth would stagnate. For Steindl the relative prosperity
of advanced capitalism’s post-War ‘Golden Age’ was the product of policy choices that recognized a
substantial role for the state in ensuring full-employment and growth.
Crucially, Steindl saw the eclipse of the Golden Age that began in the late 1960s as, first and
foremost, the product of policy choices. Following Kalecki’s predictions, full-employment policies had
“led to a growing resentment of workers claims…[and] to complaints about work discipline” on the part of
business. The consequent opposition of business leaders to a continuation of full employment policies had
produced instead a “policy of stagnation” (Steindl 1979, p. 8-9). For Steindl, no fundamental change in the
“objective circumstances” governing growth and employment had occurred. The slowing of growth in the
1970s was a counter-reaction, effected through a reversal of full employment policies, against the political
power of workers and trade unions. Thus Steindl concluded that only two forces could bring about the
restoration of earlier rates of growth and employment. Either a long-run distributional shift leading to an
increase in the wage share of national income, or full-fledged return to full employment policies of the part
of governments would be necessary (Ibid, p. 13). In their absence, mature capitalism’s underlying tendency
towards stagnation was sure to reappear.12
5 THE RISE OF THE PROFIT SQUEEZE NARRATIVE
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Steindl himself noted that he was “the product of England and Kalecki” (quoted in Shaprio 2012, p. 169)
Though he had earlier disavowed the Hansen-Sweezy contention about the decline of epochal innovations, he came
to admit that “I think now that this was foolish and I subscribe to Kalecki’s view that innovations are capable of
generating a trend” (Steindl 1979, p. 7).
12

While it was no gilded utopia, the post-War accumulation regime seemed to offer powerful
testimony to the viability of an at least modest form of social democracy. Against this backdrop, the new
heralds of crisis saw within the post-War compromise the seeds of its own demise. The relative successes
of labor, though they might have fueled a temporary consumption boom, could not be sustained in the
increasingly competitive, globalized world capital had made for itself. Prominent in shaping this narrative
on the Left were Andrew Glyn and Bob Sutcliffe. To the readers of the New Left Review (1971), and
subsequently to a broader audience in British Capitalism, Workers and the Profit Squeeze (1972), Glyn and
Sutcliffe announced that the British economy stood on the doorstep of crisis. Undoubtedly this was a daring
proclamation amidst modest unemployment and the UK's surging growth of the early 1970s. Concealed
behind this façade, they held, was a marked fall in the share of profits in national income over the latter half
of the 1960s. This development announced not so much the strength of labor, as there was no sudden uptick
in the rate of wage growth, as the evident inability of firms to pass these wage increases along through the
mark-up. Relying more on deductive reasoning than empirical evidence, Glyn and Sutcliffe charged that
this development could only be the result of heightened international competition.
The ebbing of the profit share, and the accompanying fall in the rate of profit implied, first and
foremost, a slower pace of accumulation. In their account, current profitability altered investment decisions
“by influencing expectations about the profitability of [future] investment or through their role as the major
normal source for the finance of investment (Glyn and Sutcliffe 1971, p. 14). Thus while rise in the wage
share of national income was the “decisive advance” made by the working class in the 20th century, for
capitalism “the continuation of [these] trends for a few more years would be catastrophic” (Ibid, p. 27). A
Robinsonian ‘Golden Age’ of full-employment growth was an impossibility as “[t]here is no economic
solution to the crisis in which the interests of capital and labour can be satisfied at once” (Glyn and
Sutcliffe 1972, p. 200). British workers were thus faced with a choice to accede to the demands of capital
accumulation lest it grind to a halt, or to pursue politically a socialist transformation. Their preferred
strategy was clear as they wrote that “it is time for workers not to moderate their wage demands but to
destroy the system which exploits them” (Ibid, p. 201). No other strategy could claim a foundation in
economic logic. The empirical support for this argument met with some immediate, if poorly formed,
contestation (see Yaffe 1973), but in the war of ideas, Glyn and Sutcliffe could scarcely have hoped for
stronger apparent confirmation of their thesis than the crisis into which the British economy descended in
the mid-1970s.
Glyn and Sutcliffe’s early contributions were decidedly anglocentric13, but their contentions were
soon to be generalized. In a lead article of the Monthly Review, Radford Boddy and James Crotty (1974)
both restated and generalized the profit squeeze thesis articulated by Glyn and Sutcliffe. In their account,
Keynesian theory had renewed faith in the possibility of full-employment growth under capitalism, a
possibility that Marx had squarely dismissed. As the achievement of such growth had become Keynesians'
central aim, they had necessarily “glossed over the importance of the full-employment profit squeeze”
(Ibid, p. 3). Likewise they rightly note that both Kalecki and Steindl had generally dismissed the possibility
of a profit squeeze, suggesting instead that the costs entailed by rising wages would be passed through.
Heightened international competition, manifest in the erosion of US trade surpluses, rendered capitalists’
inflationary accommodation of wage gains problematic. Mustering data from the US to support their case,
the apparent cyclicality of the wage share, along with the seeming rise in unit labor costs in the tail-end of
business cycle expansions lent considerable doubt to the Kalecki-Steindl proposition. Rising wages were
not the only cause of the spike in unit labor costs during expansions, as it was also suggested that
productivity growth would slow due in part to “an increasingly obstreperous labor force” (Ibid, p. 9). These
dual mechanisms of the profit squeeze would play a central role in later models.
6 RATIONAL CHOICE MARXISM AND THE VIABILITY OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
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  Glyn and his co-authors Philip Armstrong and John Harrison (1984) were to later extend their argument to explain
the declining growth prospects of advanced capitalist countries generally. The central argument is largely a repetition
of Glyn and Sutcliffe’s earlier narrative of the late-1960s and 1970s profit squeeze. Notably they conclude that to
restore post-War rates of growth “on a capitalist basis [requires] the appropriate balance between real wages and
productivity…The restoration of the conditions for profitable production precludes the substantial increases in real
wages to which a left government will be committed in the eyes of its supporters” (Ibid, p. 430).

	
  

By the close of the 1970s, profound skepticism with respect to the economic viability of social
democracy was also manifest in the emergent tradition of Analytical Marxism. As characterized by Eric
Olin Wright (1994), the tradition “grew out of a belief that Marxism…was frequently burdened with a
range of methodological and metatheoretical commitments that seriously limited its explanatory potential”
(p. 179). For Wright, while the group never achieved internal political or ideological consensus, it was
nevertheless united by a number of definite methodological commitments, among them the use of
“conventional scientific norms in the elaboration of theory,” the application of formal mathematical and
causal modeling, and the “importance accorded to the intentional action of individuals.”
In a series sweeping accounts of the evolution of social democratic movements, work that
eventually coalesced into Capitalism and Social Democracy (1985), Adam Przeworski did much to shape
the group's perspective. In his account, early social democratic parties had operated with the somewhat
naive presumption that the progressive extension of the franchise would inevitably imply a socialist
transformation, with the proletariat assuming its dictatorship through electoral means. Gradually though,
the realities of participation in bourgeois democracy became apparent. The working class did not constitute
a singular ‘reactionary mass’ with identical economic interests, nor did it constitute an electoral majority.
The ability of social democratic parties to win power and to govern therefore depended on strategic
compromises among the class interests of its constituents, and with other political parties.14 Though in their
language social democratic parties claimed that socialist revolution and the abolition of social classes
remained the ultimate goal, the proximate economic transformation pursued by these early movements was
nationalization of the means of production. Their practical effects were, however, triflingly small, as “with
the exception of the French armament industry in 1936, not a single company was nationalized in Western
Europe by a social democratic government during the entire inter-war period” (Ibid, p. 48). Thus, whatever
its electoral successes, social democracy had failed to identify itself with any coherent body of economic
theory prior to the ‘Keynesian Revolution’ of the 1930s. Social democrats quickly seized upon Keynesian
theory as it offered “a goal and hence the justification for their governmental role and simultaneously
transformed the ideological significance of distributive policies that favored the working class” (Przeworksi
1980, p. 51). That is, Keynesian theory suggested to social democrats not only that they could mitigate the
cycle through counter-cyclical policies, but also, crucially, that higher wages might drive growth in
capitalist economies rather than impeding it. Armed with this theoretical apparatus, social democrats could
drift from the project of nationalization without jettisoning their fundamental class alliance. The state could
remain an active governor of the economy, soothing the vicissitudes of capitalism. This theoretical alliance
implied, for Przeworksi, that social democracy lost its previous character as a reform movement based upon
cumulative progress towards socialism, preferring instead to make the best of it under capitalism.15
Though the point finds less emphasis in this early article, central for our purposes is Przeworski's
closing suggestion that social democrats also came to discover the lingering incompatibility of their
redistributive goals with sustained accumulation and productivity growth. We are told that “[a]s long as the
process of accumulation remains private, the entire society is dependent upon maintaining private profits”
and thus that “the limit of any policy is that investment and thus profits must be protected in the long run”
(Przeworski 1980, p. 55-6). Though a formal model is absent from this presentation, Przeworski's judgment
on the irreconcilable tension within social democracy is abundantly clear. Such a model was supplied
shortly thereafter within one of Przeworski's many subsequent collaborations with his former PhD student
Michael Wallerstein. In their relatively simple two-class model of accumulation (1982) workers do not
save. Adopting a simplified Kaldor-Pasinetti model, capital accumulation depends upon capitalists' savings
out of profits, and thus the rate of growth is determined solely by the rate of profit and capitalists' saving
rate, assuming that the productivity of capital is constant. Writing at the outset of the 1980s, the return to a
model of accumulation in which full employment and capacity utilization are presumed represented a
curious choice, and one that implied predictable results with respect to the impact of redistribution on
accumulation. Within this framework, however, Przeworski and Wallerstein argued that continued robust

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
14	
  In Przeworski's words, “[t]he combination of minority status with majority rule constitutes the historical condition
under which socialists have to act…[S]ocialists must choose between a party homogeneous in its class appeal, but
sentenced to perpetual electoral defeats, and a party that struggles for electoral success as the cost of diluting its class
character” (Przeworksi 1980, p. 39).
15
Such a characterization of social democracy also finds resonance with more recent appraisals of political scientists.
(See for instance, Berman 2006 and Blyth 2002).

rates of accumulation depended on a tenuous class compromise that was unlikely to be sustained in the
presence of any meaningful measure of uncertainty.
The theoretical motivation of this approach appears fairly clear. Simply put, Przeworski and
Wallerstein viewed traditional Keynesian policies as increasingly discredited. For them, the Left of the mid
1980s seemingly lacked the maturity and introspection to recognize that the old stalwart policies of income
redistribution and social spending had become ineffective. As political strategy it “represent[ed] a reaction
of clinging to old ideas and policies that the Right claim[ed], with some justification, [had] been tried and
found wanting ” (Przeworski 1985, p. 206).16 Keynesian economics was, unfortunately, mistaken in
dismissing savings as a meaningful constraint on growth. The difficulty, in their minds was that Keynesian
economics was merely the economics of the short-run. Stepping beyond the short-period, “when the
economy is close to full employment the measures meant to increase aggregate demand and therefore
decrease aggregate savings have the effect of limiting the rate of growth of potential output.” Though latter
work was peppered with validations of redistributive taxes, Przeworki and Wallerstein (1998) continued to
operate under the same theoretical assumptions of full-employment and savings-constrained investment.
With the problem of effective demand discarded by assumption, long-run growth was inescapably profitled. Thus for Przeworski and Wallerstein recognizing the flaws of the social democratic project was
directly tied to an examination and rejection of the Keynesian-Kaleckian theoretical revolution.17
7 THE LEFT IN RETREAT
Such a wholesale rejection of the principle of effective demand in the long-run was not so quickly
forthcoming among Left economists. Nevertheless, as the decade of 1980s was ushered in by the electoral
triumphs of conservative forces, assaults on organized labor, and extraordinarily tight monetary policy
throughout much of the advanced capitalist world, the Left found itself on the defensive. Within this
domain, the 1980s witnessed the development of two essential literatures that would form the basis of the
B-M synthesis. One of these developments centered upon formal extensions of the stagnationist
perspective. Lead by Bob Rowthorn’s model (1981), this literature provided a reconciliation between
Kalecki and Steindl’s variants of the investment function, rendering investment a function of both of the
current rate of profit, and the rate of capacity utilization.18 Rowthorn’s stated justification for including the
current rate of profit in the investment function is three-fold: current profits serve as a barometer of future
profits, they serve as an immediate source of internal financing for the firm, and they can improve the
prospects for external financing. The crucial point for our purposes is that within these models only a wageled growth regime is possible. Following Rowthorn, the mid-1980s saw the introduction of a number of
explicitly stagnationist models that essentially retained the basic investment function proposed by
Rowthorn, and extended it to consider the effects of fiscal and monetary policy, as well as foreign trade.
Minor variations notwithstanding, these models were alike at the theoretical level in that they assumed that
a redistribution towards wages would have a positive impact on the rate of growth.19 While these models
are sometimes treated as a special variant of the Kaleckian model, they appear far closer to the spirit of
Kalecki and Steindl’s original contributions.
The 1980s also saw the maturation of the Social Structure of Accumulation (SSA) paradigm, most
prominently developed by Samuel Bowles, David Gordon, and Thomas Weiskopf.20 Through repeated
collaborations, these authors presented what they termed a “Marxian ‘supply-side’ interpretation” of 20th
century capitalism’s long-waves of accumulation and eventual crisis wherein the corporate rate of profit
was the “fundamental underlying determinant of accumulation and growth” (1987, p.43-44). Contributors
to the SSA paradigm explicitly viewed their approach as an alternative to the stagnationist tradition
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Among others, this chapter was jointly written with Wallerstein.
Mott (1989) for an early anticipation of the critique outlined here. Mayer (1994, p. 193) makes much the same
point noting that "[a]s the model [of Przeworski and Wallerstein] now stands , the capitalist class would happily cut
working-class consumption to zero, taking all national income as profit." 	
  
18
	
  It is often argued that Del Monte (1975) anticipated many of Rowthorn and Dutt’s results, though the latter
seemingly proved more influential.	
  
19
	
  See for instance, Dutt (1984), Taylor (1985), and Amadeo (1986).	
  
20
	
  The term itself, and the related framework of analysis, was first clearly articulated by Gordon (1978).	
  
17	
  See

discussed above, and were eager to point out what they viewed as its empirical shortcomings.21 In their
view, the crisis of the 1930s was, in a broad sense, the result of “the capitalist class being too strong and the
demand for goods and services being insufficient as a result.” Such conditions fortuitously allowed for the
interests of capital and labor to align, and allowed for the success of “Keynesian and social democratic
policies which…promised to redistribute income to labor, farmers, and other non-capitalist groups and [to]
thereby stimulate demand” (Ibid, p. 55). Such an alliance could not, however, prove to be a durable model
of growth. Taking the US economy as their central focus, the erosion of corporate profitability that began in
the late 1960s stemmed from three basic institutional and political shifts: A heightened degree of
international competition, a growing recalcitrance of labor to the demands of management fostered by low
rates of unemployment, and the mounting cost burdens of environmental and safety regulations (1983, p.
79-97). In short, the crisis of the 1970s and early 80s was a different type of crisis entirely. It was “the type
of supply-side crisis which results initially when the capitalist class is ‘too weak’” (1987, p. 55). As a
consequence of the typology, social democratic responses that relied solely on egalitarian income
redistribution were bound to meet with poor results. The only viable progressive strategy that remained was
the supersession of capitalism itself.
In its early incarnations, particularly in Beyond the Wasteland, these arguments were presented as
an historical narrative rather than as formal mathematical models of accumulation and growth.
Subsequently, the research agenda evolved to include econometric estimations of the determinants of
corporate profitability (Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf 1986). To their authors, these estimates offered
meaningful confirmation of their historical narrative. Further, in collaboration with Robert Boyer, Bowles
(1988) offered a model of employment wherein investment was eventually constrained by a high
employment profit-squeeze. This first model, which made explicit use of the dichotomy between wage- and
profit- led employment regimes, made only indirect policy suggestion. In a subsequently published
elaboration of the model (Bowles and Boyer 1990), its larger intent was made far clearer. There they noted
that one important result of their model was that it “yield[ed] classical results – lower wages going along
with higher levels of activity – even under rather extreme ‘Keynesian’ assumptions concerning savings,
invest, and exports, and the effects of government borrowing. Indeed, high-levels of employment preclude
wage-led employment regimes…suggesting the inherently contradictory nature of the social democratic
full-employment program” (Ibid, p. 210). Moreover they noted that the model ought to be seen as an
essential complement to the B-M model, a version of which appeared in the same volume.
In objecting to the Kalecki-Steindl investment function of the stagnationists, Bhaduri and Marglin
were not then simply offering a technical amendment that allowed capacity utilization and profitability to
exercise independent effects, but also formalizing nearly two decades of Left critiques of the long-run
feasibility of Keynesian social democracy. At issue was the ‘prime-mover’ in the investment decision. If
the principle barrier to investment is the existence of sufficient effective demand, changes in capacity
utilization will, for a given rate of profit, dominate the effects of the fall in the profit share. By contrast, if
“capitalists are confident of their ability to sell additional output” then the expected profitability of
investment (profit share) is the dominant variable” (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990, p. 168). The authors did not
hesitate to apply their model to post-War US experience, and to offer a narrative account of the transition
from wage-led to profit-led growth in the US. To paraphrase, they argued that in the aftermath of the
Second World War, firms in most advanced capitalist countries were able to realize high profit margins
and, necessarily, high profit shares. Fearing a return of depression-like conditions, firms’ investment was
relatively insensitive to the profit share, and accelerator effects dominated. Given such conditions, “the
strategy of wage-led growth may have been the best – indeed, the only – game in town” (Ibid, p. 175). As
firms grew more confident through the 1950s and 60s that prosperity would not be transient, the investment
function became increasingly sensitive to changes in the profit share, which for the time-being remained
high. The marked slowdown in US growth during the 1970s was thereby attributed to the fall in the profit
share, itself produced by a host of factors including the decline in the rate of productivity growth, sustained
wage pressures, and the oil price shocks. Writing at the close of the 1980s, however, the authors were
hesitant to argue that the US had made a permanent transition to a profit-led growth regime. If businesses
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  This line of argument is perhaps most forcefully and concisely stated in Weisskopf, Bowles and Gordon (1985).
There the authors contend that “demand-boosting macroeconomic strategies can be successfully pursued only when
conditions are unusually favorable for capital on the supply-side; i.e., when there is a large pool of labor to draw
upon…and when raw materials are readily available. But even when such conditions do obtain, it is virtually inevitable
that a sustained period of demand expansion will undermine them” (p. 280, emphasis added).	
  	
  

had again lost confidence in sustained economic growth, as Marglin and Bhaduri argue was the case, the
growth regime of the US might have again reverted to the wage-led type (p.180-3). Thus, while Marglin
and Bhaduri defined the categories around which much future debate in post-Keynesian growth theory
would center, they should not be seen as the originators of the view that the US economy had made a
definitive transition to a profit-led growth regime. The model was, nevertheless, the outcome of a
generation Left social scientists that had become deeply skeptical of the possibility of egalitarian
redistribution under capitalism, and of the political ambitions of Keynesian and social democratic parties.
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